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Abstract
This paper analyzes the international transmission of shocks in economies with ¯-
nancial frictions. In a two-country °exible price monetary model with distribution costs
in the imported good I study the transmission of shocks to productivity, money supply,
government spending and to entrepreneurs' net worth.
Financial frictions amplify the e®ects of shocks both at the domestic and at the in-
ternational level. In the model, international business cycle comovement, measured as
cross-country output correlations, is increasing in the degree of openness and distribution
costs, and as in previous literature, decreasing in the degree of ¯nancial frictions. Finally,
¯scal shocks play an important role in international business cycle comovement in the
presence of ¯nancial frictions. First, because the crowding out e®ect is stronger on pri-
vate consumption and weaker on investment if there are ¯nancial frictions, and second,
because ¯scal shocks may reduce the cross-country correlation of output.
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prices.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies the business cycle comovement across countries with imperfect credit
markets. In a two-country °exible price general equilibrium monetary model I analyze the
international transmission of shocks to productivity, money supply, government spending,
and net worth, and the implications of the degree of ¯nancial frictions and transport costs in
this transmission.
There is a growing literature on the determinants of international comovement.1 Although
there is no agreement on the key variables that explain cross-country correlations, the de-
terminant that gathers most consensus is the degree of bilateral trade. However, evidence
supporting other a priori relevant factors such as the degree of ¯nancial integration does not
appear to be so conclusive (Baxter and Koupartisas, 2004; Bordo and Hebling, 2003).
This paper attempts to shed some light on the role of imperfections in ¯nancial markets
for the international transmission of shocks. In a closed economy, ¯nancial frictions amplify
and propagate the response of the economy to exogenous shocks (Bernanke et al., 2000; de
Blas, 2003). In an open economy there is not only ampli¯cation and propagation because of
¯nancial frictions, but also additional e®ects incorporated by the international transmission of
shocks. These additional channels are analyzed in this work. I also focus on the transmission
of shocks to government spending and on the existence of distribution costs in the import of
consumption goods.
Previous literature has investigated the international transmission of shocks in economies
with nominal rigidities and ¯nancial frictions (Faia, 2002; Hairault et al., 2003). The main
focus of these papers is to analyze the transmission of shocks to productivity across countries
under di®erent exchange rate regimes and monetary policy rules. However, little attention
has been paid to the international transmission of ¯scal shocks. This type of perturbations
becomes relevant, for example, in the context of a monetary union, since ¯scal policy is the
only instrument left for stabilizing the economy. Moreover, these papers assume that the law
of one price holds, so that any excess demand at home is automatically supplied at no extra
1For a recent example see Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004).
2cost from the foreign country. However, trade costs can be large and may alter the response
of the economy to certain shocks (Hummels, 1999; Burnstein et al., 2002).
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, I develop a two-country
°exible price monetary model in which each country has credit market imperfections.2 Pre-
vious work with °exible price models (Schlagenhauf and Wrase, 1995) has failed to reproduce
the dynamics of interest rate and exchange rates, mainly after a monetary supply innovation.
The model presented here di®ers from previous setups in two ways. First, unlike Schlagenhauf
and Wrase, households in the domestic country only need to hold their domestic currency to
purchase a consumption basket made out of a combination of domestic and foreign consump-
tion goods. Using a framework similar to that employed by Burnstein, Neves and Rebelo
(2003), I introduce distribution costs in a °exible price monetary model to capture the e®ects
of costly international trade in the correlation of consumption across countries.
The second main contribution is the analysis of the role of ¯scal shocks in the international
transmission of shocks. Although there is no doubt that innovations in government spending
lead to a rise in employment and a fall in real wages, there is mixed evidence of the e®ects of
such innovations on consumption (Fat¶ as and Mihov, 2002; Burnside et al. 2002). Recently,
Gal¶ ³ et al. (2003) analyze the e®ects of changes in government purchases on aggregate
variables. They show that the ¯nal e®ects of government spending on consumption depend
on several factors, including the degree of price stickiness and the proportion of rule-of-thumb
consumers.
In the present paper, imperfections in credit markets amplify the e®ects of shocks both
at the domestic and at the international level. However, if the degree of ¯nancial frictions
increases in both countries, cross-country output correlations are reduced in response to
both productivity and net worth shocks. That is, international business cycle comovement,
measured as cross-country output correlations, is increasing in the degree of openness and
distribution costs, and as in previous literature, decreasing in the degree of ¯nancial frictions.
Additionally, the output-consumption puzzle can be solved but this requires a degree of
distribution costs that implies roughly more than 80% of distribution margin, which is too
2The frictionless version of this model is analyzed in detail in a previous paper (de Blas, 2005).
3high compared to the values reported in the data. Nonetheless, it appears that a model with
moderate importing costs might help improve the model's predictions in this dimension.
Finally, the paper ¯nds a key role for ¯scal shocks in two ways. First, in this neoclassi-
cal model, a rise in government spending reduces the crowding-out e®ect in investment while
making it stronger on consumption if there are ¯nancial frictions. Second, ¯scal shocks reduce
the international comovement of output, more so the higher the degree of openness and distri-
bution costs. In the case of ¯nancial frictions this is also true, and cross-country correlations
even become negative if shocks are uncorrelated. This last result is relevant to the extent
that it hinges on the role of ¯scal policy in the comovement of output across countries. This
model reports that under independent monetary policies, international output comovement
may diverge if countries have imperfect ¯nancial markets. Notice that this is important in
order to investigate whether monetary integration leads to a stronger comovement of cycles
or not, which recently has become a topic of interest.
The paper is structured as follows. Some stylized facts of international business cycles
are analyzed in Section 2. Sections 3 to 5 develop the model, equilibrium conditions and
parameterization of the economy. In Section 6, I investigate the transmission of shocks
in a scenario with ¯nancial frictions and compare it to the frictionless case. I discuss the
international transmission of shocks in Section 7. Conclusions in Section 8 close the paper.
2 International business cycles in the data
In this section I provide with some stylized facts about the international comovement of out-
put, consumption and investment. The sample analyzed goes from 1980:1 to 2004:2 (except
for Germany where the starting point is 1991:1) and the countries considered are Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, an aggregate for the European Monetary Union (henceforth
EMU), Japan, United Kingdom and the USA. Data are from the OECD Quarterly National
Accounts, and have been logged and detrended using Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter. Results are
displayed in Tables 1 to 3.
As expected, cross-country correlations of output are higher than those of consumption
or investment for most of the countries. Needless to say, output comovement across countries
4in the Euro area is stronger than with Japan, USA and even the UK. The same statement is
true for consumption and investment, what con¯rms a kind of convergence in the behavior of
these countries, now belonging to a monetary union. The case of Germany should be taken
carefully due to the reduced number of data points available to analyze business cycles, and
because this country has been subject to a distinct economic situation after the reuni¯cation.
In addition, Table 4 reports country-speci¯c correlations for output, consumption, in-
vestment and government spending. The procyclicality of consumption and investment is
con¯rmed for all the countries. Notice also that as in the literature, there is no clear pattern
about the cyclical character of government spending. For the cases considered here, it varies
from being procyclical to countercyclical and in many cases there is no relationship at all
between output and public spending.
The same inconclusive pattern is derived for the correlation between private and public
consumption. This is in line with the debate over the e®ects of government spending on
private consumption. According to traditional Keynesian theory, higher government spending
leads to higher private consumption due to the increase in disposable income. However,
neoclassical economists would tend to say that the relationship is negative, and higher public
spending reduces private consumption through an intertemporal substitution e®ect. Finally,
there is a clear crowding out e®ect of public spending on private investment, since correlations
are negative for all countries except for Spain and Italy.
3 The model
In this economy there are two countries of equal size, Home and Foreign, with identical
preferences and technology. Variables referring to the Foreign country are denoted by an
asterisk.
Each country is composed of households, ¯rms, ¯nancial intermediaries, and a domestic
monetary authority.3 Only consumption goods are traded. Within each country households
3 For simplicity, I adopt Lucas' terminology and deal with families in each country composed of di®erent
agents. This family splits early in the morning to play separate roles, and gather at the end of the day to
share all their earnings.
5consume a composite of the Home and Foreign goods. Labor input is immobile across coun-
tries, but not capital.
Firms in both countries hire people and rent capital from households to produce a homoge-
neous good. They have no initial funds so they borrow the wage bill from their own country's
¯nancial intermediaries. Home ¯rms are a®ected by a productivity shock to production.
The model of Schlagenhauf and Wrase (1995) shares the same basic features of limited
participation as this paper. Their model di®ers from mine in the way they open the economy.
They assume that in order to buy foreign consumption goods, households need to hold foreign
currency, which they obtain in the exchange market at the beginning of the period at a price
et; the nominal exchange rate. In contrast to that setup, I assume (as do most open-economy
macro papers) that households in each country have access to a composite of consumption
goods made out of domestic and foreign goods. Households only need domestic currency
for both types of purchases. I assume that ¯nal goods ¯rms import foreign consumption
goods, by trading directly with foreign ¯rms. Any di®erence in value between imports and
exports is covered by exchanging domestic bonds at the nominal exchange rate. In addition,
I introduce distribution costs in this °exible price model, breaking the law of one price that
holds in Schlagenhauf and Wrase's model.
At each moment the state of the economy is de¯ned by st; whose history is given by
st = fs0;:::;stg with probability ¼(st): This information structure will apply to all variables
except for the choice of deposits. I will assume limited participation of households in ¯nancial
markets, this means that they will choose how much money to deposit at the bank depending
on last period's information set, st¡1; with history st¡1 = fs0;:::;st¡1g ; and therefore with
probability ¼(st¡1): In all cases, the initial realization s0 is given.
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of in¯nite-lived households in the interval [0,1] in each country. The
representative household at Home chooses consumption, C(st); labor supply, L(st); and de-











where E0 denotes the expectational operator conditional on the time 0 information set, and
¯ 2 (0;1) is the household's subjective discount factor. Households consume a composite of


















where µ denotes the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of consumption, and Ã is
the inverse of the labor supply elasticity with respect to real wages, assumed to be constant.
The representative household begins time t with money holdings from the previous period,
¹ M(st¡1). At the beginning of the period, a fraction of these money holdings is allocated to
deposits at the bank, ¹ D(st¡1): These transactions are done in the domestic currency. In this
setup, household's deposits, ¹ D(st¡1); are chosen before the state of the economy is known
re°ecting the limited participation character of the model. This disables households from
responding to a current shock by changing deposits within the same period, and induces the
liquidity e®ect of a money supply shock on the nominal interest rate observed in the data.5
Households supply elastically labor to ¯rms and receive in return wage payments, ¹ W(st)L(st),
that can be spent within the same period.6 This wage income plus money holdings minus
4Henceforth, upper bar letters will denote nominal variables not normalized. Plain upper case letters will
denote nominal variables once normalized. And lower case letters will refer to the growth rates of variables.
5 The mechanism is the following. After a money injection, there is an excess liquidity in the economy
that needs to be absorbed to reestablish equilibrium. Households cannot change their portfolio choice until
the following period, therefore ¯rms are the only agents able to clear the money market. The central bank
achieves money market clearing by reducing the interest rate so that ¯rms are willing to borrow the excess
amount of funds. For a formal explanation see Fuerst (1992).
6By allowing households to spend their wage earnings within the same period the impact of in°ation on
employment is eliminated. For more details on this, see Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
7deposits is devoted to consumption purchases, ¹ P(st)C(st), as re°ected in the following cash-
in-advance constraint:
¹ M(st¡1) ¡ ¹ D(st¡1) + ¹ W(st)L(st) ¸ ¹ P(st)C(st): (4)
Monetary funds at home °ow from time t to time t + 1 according to
¹ M(st) = ¹ M(st¡1) ¡ ¹ D(st¡1) + ¹ W(st)L(st) ¡ ¹ P(st)C(st) ¡ ¹ PH(st)Q(st)Zd(st) + ¹ Qk(st)K(st¡1)
+RD(st) ¹ D(st¡1) + ¹ ¦FI(st) + ¹ ¦F(st) ¡ ¹ PH(st)Tt; (5)
with the demand for investment equal to
Zd(st) = K(st) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)K(st¡1): (6)
Equation (5) says that at the end of the period, all the money in the economy goes back
to the household's hands. That is, he gets what remains from consumption and capital
purchases, ¹ P(st)C(st)+ ¹ PH(st)Q(st)Zd(st), where Q(st) is the price of capital goods in terms
of consumption goods, and deposits at the bank, ¹ D(st¡1); plus wage income, ¹ W(st)L(st);
capital rents, ¹ Qk(st)K(st¡1); at a rental price ¹ Qk(st), principal plus interest from deposits at
the gross rate RD(st); pro¯ts from ¯rms, ¹ ¦F(st); and those from the ¯nancial intermediary,
¹ ¦FI(st); which he owns. Finally, households must pay lump sum taxes, Tt, that ¯nance
government spending.












































8¹ PH(st)CH(st) = (1 ¡ °) ¹ P(st)C(st); (10)
¹ PF(st)CF(st) = ° ¹ P(st)C(st); (11)




H (st) ¹ P
°
F(st)
(1 ¡ °)1¡°°° = · ¹ P
1¡°
H (st) ¹ P
°
F(st); (12)
with · = 1
(1¡°)1¡°°°.
Households are symmetric across countries, so the corresponding ¯rst order conditions
apply to Foreign households.
3.2 Firms
Firms in each economy produce a homogeneous good, Y (st): Production requires the use of
labor, H(st); and capital, K(st¡1); as inputs through the following production function
Y (st) = AtH(st)®hK(st¡1)®k; (13)




where ½a is the autocorrelation of the shock, and "t is an i.i.d. exogenous disturbance. Firms
own no initial funds so they borrow from the ¯nancial intermediary the wage bill, ¹ L(st), at
the gross interest rate, RL(st). Firms only get indebted in their home currency. Additionally,
¯rms are in charge of importing foreign goods for domestic consumption. To do that, they
buy (sell) nominal bonds which are in zero net supply, ¹ B(st); to cover the extra amount sold
(bought) of C(st): These bonds cost an interest rate RB(st):
These perfectly competitive ¯rms solve the following maximization problem:
max






¹ ¦F(st) = ¹ PH(st)Y (st)¡ ¹ W(st)H(st)¡ ¹ Qk(st)K(st¡1)¡
£
RL(st) ¡ 1
¤ ¹ L(st)+ ¹ B(st)¡RB(st¡1) ¹ B(st¡1);
(16)
subject to
Y (st) = AtH(st)®hK(st¡1)®k; (17)
¹ L(st) ¸ ¹ W(st)H(st); (18)
¹ B(st) = RB(st¡1) ¹ B(st¡1) + ¹ e(st) ¹ P¤
F(st)CF(st) ¡ ¹ PH(st)C¤
H(st); (19)
that is, ¯rms produce a homogenous good, Y (st) through the technology described in equation
(17). To do that, they need to hire labor, H(st), and capital, K(st¡1):
Equation (19) is the Home country Current Account. It re°ects the evolution of the
nominal bonds, ¹ B(st); a ¯rm buys (sells) depending on current imports, ¹ e(st) ¹ P¤
F(st)CF(st);
being higher (lower) than current exports, ¹ PH(st)C¤
H(st); and on the amount of past bonds
held, ¹ B(st¡1); all in terms of the domestic currency. This equation will be spelled out further
when I discuss distribution costs. The term e(st) denotes the nominal exchange rate (units
of Home currency per unit of Foreign currency).7

































7Denoted in this way a depreciation of the Home currency means a increase of e(s
t); and viceversa.
103.3 Distribution costs
In this model, I introduce distribution costs associated with the imported good in each
country.8 I consider the case in which part of the importing country's production is dedicated
to transport. Introducing these costs means that at Home the price at which producers export
consumption goods ( ¹ PH) will not be the same as the price at which Foreign consumers import
the same good ( ¹ P¤
H). The di®erence is that some distribution costs must be paid to consume
the imported good. These distribution costs are represented by the fraction Á: This real
friction means that absolute purchasing power parity need not always hold, in spite of the
fact that prices are perfectly °exible. Let rer(st) be the real exchange rate de¯ned as
rer(st) =
¹ e(st) ¹ P¤(st)
¹ P(st)
; (24)
then with distribution costs rer(st) need not equal 1: In principle, both ways of introducing
distribution costs drive a wedge between prices indices in both countries making it possible
for a model with °exible prices to depart from the law of one price. But as I show below,
these formulations of transport costs yield di®erent results in the dynamics of exchange rates
and the current account.
3.3.1 Absence of distribution costs
Consider ¯rst the case in which there are no distribution costs of importing/exporting goods
(Á = 0). Then we have








that is, the law of one price holds for each of these goods.
8 In de Blas (2005), I develop a more detailed analysis of the introduction of distribution costs in this
°exible price model and compare it with the case of iceberg costs.
11However, since each country has di®erent preferences over the goods (° < 1
2 for home
bias), the real price of consumption will di®er in general between the two countries. The
consumer price indices in the two countries are
¹ P(st) = · ¹ P
1¡°
















¤1¡° £ ¹ PH(st)
¤° :
(28)
It can be seen from these formulas that absolute purchasing power parity will hold, that
is ¹ P(st) = ¹ e(st) ¹ P¤(st) and therefore rer(st) = 1; in all states st; if and only if ° = 1
2: (This is
the case in which there is no bias for or against home goods, making preferences in the two
countries symmetric.) Therefore, absolute purchasing power parity (henceforth PPP) does
not hold at all times even with °exible prices and costless transport. However, empirical
research rejects the hypothesis of the absolute PPP. Thus, it may be more interesting to
analyze the relative version of the PPP.
In a °exible price setting, prices react immediately to any shock, and if this happens in
both countries such reaction may o®set any movement in the real exchange rate. In order to
prevent such an o®set from happening I recur to distribution costs.
The scenario is di®erent in the case of distribution costs. For Home ¯rms who import
CF(st) this means that they will pay
¹ PF(st) = ¹ e(st) ¹ P¤
F(st) + Á ¹ PH(st); (29)
re°ecting expenditure of Home goods to import the Foreign good (due, for example, to
transport costs or services necessary to bring the foreign good to the Home country). These
extra costs are a ¯xed fraction, Á; of the Home good, and must be paid in domestic goods
costing ¹ PH(st):
A symmetric assumption will hold for the Foreign country, which imports C¤
H(st) units





+ Á ¹ P¤
F(st); (30)
12in units of the foreign currency. For simplicity, I will assume that the degree of distribution
costs, Á; is the same across countries.
Under distribution costs, the current account (equation (19)) is
¹ B(st) = RB(st¡1) ¹ B(st¡1) + ¹ et ¹ P¤
F(st)CF(st) ¡ ¹ PH(st)C¤
H(st): (31)
Here it can be seen that exporter earnings do not include transport costs. Transport costs
have no e®ect on the current account since they are paid inside the exporting country.
3.3.2 Distribution costs and exchange rates
Consider the linearized version of the price indices in both countries
^ pt = (1 ¡ °)^ pHt + °^ pFt; (32)
^ p¤
t = (1 ¡ °)^ p¤
Ft + °^ p¤
Ht: (33)






























implying CPIs as follows:
^ pt =
·


































In this case, the real exchange rate will be (after some algebra)
c rert = ^ et+^ p¤
t ¡^ pt =
·






















Here the degree of distribution costs clearly a®ects the dynamics of the real exchange
rate. In previous work (de Blas, 2005) I analyze more in detail the e®ects of introducing
13distribution costs in this way on the dynamics of nominal and real exchange rate dynamics.
Most monetary models ¯nd it di±cult to generate two of the stylized facts related with
exchange rate dynamics. First, exchange rates are much more volatile than output, highly
persistent and correlated. Considering distribution costs in the trade of goods allows the
model presented here to generate nominal and real depreciation after a money injection.
Exchange rates also are persistent and correlated in line with empirical evidence, but still the
model fails to generate quantitatively highly volatile exchange rates. So, this approach seems
to go in the direction of improving exchange rate dynamics, but still needs to investigate
further the factors that contribute to generate variability of exchange rates.
3.4 Financial intermediaries
Banks have the role of taking funds from those who have resources to lend, and making them
available to agents in need of funding. In this case, the representative Home bank will collect
deposits from Home households, ¹ D(st¡1); and together with the monetary injection of the
Home central bank, ¹ X(st); will transform these funds into loans to ¯rms every period, ¹ L(st).
At the end of the period, the ¯nancial intermediary receives principal plus interest on the
loans from ¯rms, additionally, it has to pay back principal plus interests due on households'
deposits, RD(st) ¹ D(st¡1): These pro¯ts are then distributed to households, who own the
banks, at the end of the period, as is seen from equation (5),
¦
FI
t = R(st)X(st): (39)
3.5 Entrepreneurs
Capital is produced by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, live only one period,
and can each carry out one project that requires one unit of consumption goods. The en-
trepreneur operates a technology that transforms this unit of consumption goods into
»
!t
units of capital goods.9 The variable
»
!t is an idiosyncratic shock uniformly distributed in
the non-negative interval [1 ¡ !;1 + !]; with density Á(
»
!t) and distribution function ©(
»
!t).
9 Notice that in this sense, the production of capital will depend on the amount of consumption goods,
that is a®ected by international factors such as the exchange rate and the current account.
14Every period, after production takes place, part of the output Yt is transferred lump-
sum to entrepreneurs; this constitutes their net worth NWt. According to the data, NWt
is positively related with output, and more volatile than output; the elasticity of net worth
with respect to output will be called ».10 Net worth will also be a®ected by a shock Zt
which captures other factors (e.g. changes in taxes or in market power) a®ecting ¯rms' cash
positions, so I assume NWt = ZtY
»
t .
To generate ¯nancial frictions, it is assumed that this net worth is insu±cient for the
entrepreneur's project. Moreover, since entrepreneurs live for only one period they cannot
accumulate wealth.11 Therefore, they need to borrow the di®erence between their required
investment and their endowment, 1¡NWt: Firms are assumed to lend to entrepreneurs in a
competitive market, and to be able to deal with a su±cient number of entrepreneurs in order
to pool their idiosyncratic risk. In other words, ¯rms can set up a \mutual fund" to lend to
entrepreneurs.
The relationship between entrepreneurs and the mutual fund is a®ected by asymmetric
information. When they sign their contract, neither the lender nor entrepreneurs can observe
the idiosyncratic shock. Afterwards,
»
!t is revealed to the entrepreneurs, but the lender cannot
observe this outcome unless he monitors. Monitoring costs are a ¯xed proportion ¹c > 0 of
the capital produced. Thus capital production involves a costly state veri¯cation problem,
which is optimally solved by a standard debt contract, according to Townsend (1979), and
Gale and Hellwig (1985). In this debt contract, an entrepreneur who borrows (1 ¡ NWt)
consumption goods agrees to repay Rk
t(1 ¡ NWt) units of capital, if the realization of
»
!t
is good. If the realization of
»
!t is bad, then the entrepreneur prefers to default. Thus the
default decision is determined by a threshold value !t which satis¯es
!t ´ Rk
t(1 ¡ NWt): (40)
10 This assumption is a reduced form way to deal with the fact that in good times investors end up with
more cash available than in bad times. This could also be done through a dynamic problem for entrepreneurs,
where net worth would be another state variable of the system, possibly di®erent among entrepreneurs, but
this di±cult extension is left for future research.
11The transfer they receive is taxed away when entrepreneurs die, i.e. at the end of the period, and then
returned lump sum to consumers.
15In the optimal contract, the lender monitors in case of default, and con¯scates all the en-
trepreneur's production, but nothing more. That is, entrepreneurs have limited liability.
To ensure that this debt contract is e±cient and incentive compatible, the participation of
lenders must be guaranteed. The mutual fund will ¯nd it pro¯table to lend the entrepreneurs
as long as the expected return net of monitoring costs (at least) equals the amount lent:










Here the left hand side denotes the amount borrowed by entrepreneurs, and the right hand
side re°ects the expected return on this loan, net of monitoring costs.12
Also, participation of the entrepreneur in the contract must be assured. This means that







!t) ¡ [1 ¡ ©(!t)]!t
¾
´ Qtf(!t) = NWt; (42)
where the left hand side denotes the entrepreneur's expected payo®. This expected value
includes expected production of capital, minus what must be paid back on the loan, both
conditional on not defaulting.
This costly state veri¯cation problem is solved taking as given the sequence of variables
fNW(st);Q(st);Rk(st)g1
t=0: From equations (41) and (42) above, it follows that
Q(st) =
1






f(!(st)) + g(!(st)) = 1 ¡ ©(!(st))¹c; (44)
that is, if monitoring costs are positive, ¹c > 0; part of the output is destroyed by these costs,
©(!(st))¹c, while the rest is divided between the entrepreneur, f(!(st)), and the lender,
g(!(st)). The number of projects undertaken, i(st); net of monitoring costs, constitutes the
supply of capital:




12 Credit rationing issues are avoided in this setup since expected returns going to the mutual fund are
increasing in the threshold value !t: For more details on this see Bernanke et al. (2000).
163.6 The ¯scal authority
There is a government in this economy which consumes an amount Gt: This government
spending is ¯nanced by lump sum taxes levied from households, Tt: In this economy govern-




with ½g 2 (0;1); and "g;t is an i.i.d. normal shock with zero mean and standard deviation ¾"
g:
It is assumed that in each country, the ¯scal authority maintains a balanced budget every
period, that is,
Gt = Tt; for 8t: (47)
3.7 The central bank
The central bank in this model is in charge of conducting monetary policy. It issues money
directly to ¯nancial intermediaries at an exogenously given rate ¹t that follows an AR(1)
process, with autocorrelation coe±cient ½¹ 2 (0;1). According to this, the new injection of
money each period is
¹ X(st) = ¹t ¹ M(st¡1); (48)
so that the total amount of money at the end of period t and beginning of t + 1 will be
¹ M(st) = ¹ M(st¡1) + ¹ X(st): (49)
4 Equilibrium conditions
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of functions, and a set of variables such that







the following needs to hold:
i) households' problem is solved, that is, utility is maximized (1), subject to (2)-(6);
ii) ¯rms' problem is solved, that is, pro¯ts are maximized (15), subject to (16)-(19);
iii) the entrepreneur's problem is solved, given Rk; Q; and NW,
17iv) banks behave in a competitive way;
v) there is no arbitrage in credit markets, that is,
RD(st) = RL(st) = R(st); (50)
RD¤(st) = RL¤(st) = R¤(st); (51)
vi) and ¯nally markets clear, that is,
H(st) = N(st); (52)
H¤(st) = N¤(st); (53)
¹ D(st) + ¹ Xt = ¹ W(st)H(st); (54)
¹ D¤(st) + ¹ X¤
t = ¹ W¤(st)H¤(st); (55)
Zs(st) = i(st)[1 ¡ ©(!(st))¹c] = Zd(st) = K(st) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)K(st¡1); (56)
Y (st) = CH(st) + C¤
H(st) + ÁCF(st) + i(st) + Gt; (57)
Y ¤(st) = C¤
F(st) + CF(st) + ÁC¤
H(st) + i¤(st) + G¤
t; (58)
Zs¤(st) = i¤(st)[1 ¡ ©¤(!¤(st))¹c] = Zd¤(st) = K¤(st) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)K¤(st¡1); (59)
¹ B(st) = RB(st¡1) ¹ B(st¡1) + ¹ et ¹ P¤
F(st)CF(st) ¡ ¹ PH(st)C¤
H(st); (60)




H(st) ¡ ¹ P¤
F(st)CF(st); (61)




¹ B(st) + e(st) ¹ B¤(st) = 0: (64)
185 Calibration
The model is solved by log-linearizing around the nonstochastic steady state with zero initial
nominal bonds. Since both countries are symmetric, I will only specify the parameters for the
Home country. The calibration intends to match certain stylized facts in US and European
data. The time period is a quarter. The data are mean values for US over the period
1980:1-2001:2 obtained from OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Preferences: ¯ = 0:9945; matching a annual nominal interest rate of 7:4% (US mean
of FFR) given a quarterly growth rate of M1 equal to 1:6%; intertemporal elasticity of
substitution µ = 1; and inverse of labor supply elasticity with respect to wages Ã = 0:7;
both parameters are consistent with other studies as mentioned by Chari et al. (1999) and
with separable preferences over consumption and leisure imply a larger volatility for exchange
rates; ° = 0:15 degree of openness implying a ratio of imports over output equal to 10:4%
(consistent with the USA-Europe case).
Technology: capital's share of output ® = 0:36; due to constant returns to scale assump-
tion labor's share of output is 1¡® = 0:64; rate of depreciation is ± = 10% annual, meaning
a ratio of capital over output of 10:77; distribution costs Á = 3:8% meaning a distribution
margin equal to 3:7% consistent with measures by Hummels (1999) for the US.
Exogenous shocks: the parameters governing the productivity and money growth pro-
cesses for both countries are estimated from data for the US and an aggregate of European
countries. Regarding productivity shocks, I follow the procedure employed by Backus, Kehoe
and Kydland (1992) and use the data in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2001) to estimate the
Solow residuals for the US (Home) and Europe (Foreign). The sample goes from 1972:1 to

































19However, to impose symmetry across countries I calculate the symmetric matrix whose











with 0:0071 and 0:2953 as standard deviation and correlations, respectively, for the produc-
tivity innovations.
Regarding money growth processes I proceed in the same way as before. The data now are
M1 and obtained from the OECD and correspond to the US and an aggregate of European
































Again imposing symmetry across countries and assuming that monetary growth processes












with 0:0074 and 0:08 as standard deviation and correlations, respectively, for the monetary
innovations.
The autocorrelation of ¯scal shocks (½g) is set to 0:95, and the standard deviation is
¾"
g = 0:004: To compare the e®ects of correlated and uncorrelated ¯scal shocks it is assumed
that the correlation is 0:25:
Financial frictions: Gertler (1995) assigns » (elasticity of pro¯ts with respect to output)
a value of 4:45: Taking data on corporate pro¯ts after tax and US GDP for the period 1947:1-
2002:1 I obtain an elasticity of pro¯ts (net worth) with respect to output equal to 3:84. I
calibrate Rk to match a risk premium of 191 basis points measured by the spread between the
20bank prime rate and the three-month commercial paper rate on average terms. The bound !
on the support of the uniform distribution of ~ !t is chosen to match an annual bankruptcy rate,
©(!t); of 10% for US data from 1980-2001.13 The proportion of internal project ¯nancing,
NW; is set equal to 0.15 as in Gertler (1995). The value of monitoring costs, ¹c; is set equal
20% as in Fuerst (1995). This calibration implies a threshold value, ¹ ! of 0:8619; obtained
from combining equations (40)-(43) in the steady state. Just for the simulations net worth
shocks are assumed to be highly persistent (½Z = 0:9), and highly volatile (¾Z = 0:02).
6 Adding ¯nancial frictions
In this section, I study how the international transmission of shocks changes when ¯nancial
frictions are introduced. In particular, I assume the economy is a®ected by three types of
shocks: productivity, ¯scal, and net worth shocks. Results are depicted in Figures 1 to 4 for
the case without (¹c = 0) and with (¹c > 0) ¯nancial frictions. In both cases, correlated
shocks are assumed. By correlated shocks I mean the case in with the autocorrelation and
variance-covariance matrices are both full matrices, in contrast with the uncorrelated case
in which both cross-country correlation coe±cients and covariances are zero in each of the
shock processes.
In all the cases below, the ¯gures show the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation
shock at Home, at time t = 2: Variables are plotted in percentage deviations from steady
state. The solid-crossed line stands for the frictionless case and the dash-circled line for the
model with ¯nancial frictions.
Before analyzing each shock separately, Table 5 reports the simulated unconditional mo-
ments for the correlated and uncorrelated shocks in the models with and without ¯nancial
frictions. First fact to remark is that as expected, the volatility of output increases in the
model with ¯nancial frictions. The procyclicality of consumption is somehow reduced in the
model with ¯nancial frictions, whereas those of investment and labor are increased. Finally,
13US Business Bankruptcy Filings over Total Filings 1980-2001. Source: ABI World. This value is similar
to the ones provided by Gertler (1995) and Fisher (1999).
21cross-country output correlations are closer to zero in the framework with credit market im-
perfections. The international comovement of consumption is quite similar, whereas that of
investment is stronger, either negative or positive, when there are ¯nancial frictions.
These moments, even though they include many di®erent e®ects, characterize the impli-
cations of the main ingredients of the model. Basically, that the introduction of ¯nancial
frictions in the way it is done here strengthens the relationship between output and invest-
ment while reducing that between output and consumption. In what follows below, I analyze
separately the implications of each shock for the dynamics of the model taking into account
the existence of ¯nancial frictions.
6.1 Productivity shocks
Figure 1 and Table 6 show the results. In the two cases, the productivity shock increases
output at Home (where the shock originated) leading to an rise in consumption, investment
and labor. Prices fall and there is both a nominal and a real depreciation. The higher
productivity in the production of the Home good makes it less expensive compared to the
Foreign good. Internationally, this shifts demand from the Foreign to the Home good and
induces a fall in Foreign output (which is usually called expenditure switching e®ect).
When ¯nancial frictions are considered, the responses of almost all variables are enhanced
with respect to the frictionless case, as found in closed economy models. The international
transmission mechanism works through two channels: the expenditure switching e®ect, and
the high procyclicality of entrepreneurs' net worth (absent in the frictionless case). Higher
output increases the internal ¯nancing capacity of entrepreneurs that produce more capital
at a lower price. This boosts investment and therefore ampli¯es the response of output. The
e®ects are transmitted abroad with a lag. Foreign households switch consumption of their
domestic good for Home consumption goods.
Since productivity is correlated across countries over time, output in the foreign country
eventually rises. But initially, the expenditure switching e®ect abroad dominates the incip-
ient boom, driving output down as demand for Foreign goods declines. Hence investment
22falls, especially in the economy with ¯nancial frictions. Thus overall, in the foreign coun-
try, consumption rises, investment falls, and prices fall, especially when there are ¯nancial
frictions.
Finally, in all the cases analyzed in this paper, nominal exchange rates react more and
real exchange rates less when there are ¯nancial frictions. The reason is that, in addition to
the supply e®ect of the shock there is a demand e®ect at Foreign that makes foreign goods
more expensive relatively to Home goods. Therefore, the real depreciation is less so under
credit market imperfections.
As a conclusion, countries move in the same direction in response to productivity shocks,
but ¯nancial frictions reduce this comovement. Table 6 displays second order properties
of the model after a productivity shock. The table also considers the case of uncorrelated
shocks under ¯nancial frictions in order to help separate out what aspects of the dynamics are
caused by international correlation between the shocks. Unsurprisingly, the increase in the
correlation of the shocks makes countries move closer, as shown in Table 6. The magnitude
of the comovement of consumption across countries is reduced and so are those of output
and investment if there are ¯nancial frictions. This result is developed in more detail in the
next section, where I analyze cross-country correlations as the degree of ¯nancial frictions
increase. An interesting question is how the presence of ¯nancial frictions a®ects international
business cycle correlations in the event of shocks to productivity. It is also of interest to see
how independent monetary policies or a common monetary policy should react to these
shocks.
6.2 Money supply shocks
Although the study of the transmission of monetary policy focuses recently on the use of
interest rate rules by the central bank, in this section I analyze a sudden and exogenous
increase in money supply. The reason for this analysis is to get some insight of the transmis-
sion of monetary shocks in a two-country world with °exible prices and ¯nancial frictions.
I undertake a more detailed analysis of such a perturbation in a frictionless model (see de
Blas, 2005). In that paper, I investigate which alternative speci¯cations of this °exible price
23monetary model can reproduce the liquidity e®ect after a money injection together with
both nominal and real depreciations in an open economy framework. Now, I go further by
analyzing the implications of such e®ects when there are ¯nancial frictions.
The results are shown in Figure 2 an Table 7. Although not reported here, the model
with frictions still reports liquidity e®ects and increased international interest rates spreads
together with nominal depreciation of the domestic currency. In contrast to what is observed
in the data, the model shows real appreciation after a money injection. The magnitude of
the e®ects is larger under ¯nancial frictions, and is driven mainly through the adjustment
of consumption and investment with no signi¯cant di®erent e®ect on output. The stronger
international transmission of shocks across countries makes foreign prices fall by more than
in the frictionless case. Then, despite the nominal depreciation, the real exchange rate goes
down. In the face of extra money supply, interest rates fall, reducing the wedge between the
prices of cash and credit goods. Labor and consumption increase, but the fall in the price of
capital is not enough to boost investment.
Notice that the boom at Home is not transmitted to the Foreign country. Instead, re-
sources are reallocated from investment towards consumption. The reason is that the money
injection at Home rises domestic goods prices and this shifts demand towards the foreign
good. Such an e®ect is absent in a closed economy. Since capital is country speci¯c it is not
favored by lower prices abroad. Therefore resources are shifted from investment towards con-
sumption. At the same time the nominal depreciation of the Home currency favors exports,
and increase foreign consumption.
With ¯nancial frictions the e®ects are stronger. Lower interest rates favor cash goods
instead of credit goods. If there are credit market imperfections the wedge between con-
sumption and investment prices is larger. The e®ects of the shock then become stronger
because the rise in consumption reduces the amount of goods available for capital produc-
tion. Since capital is country speci¯c, then it is constrained, and the fall in investment is
larger. The model fails in re°ecting a real appreciation that is stronger under credit market
imperfections. This appreciation strengthens the expenditure switching e®ect towards foreign
goods.
24The main di®erences in the dynamics with respect to the closed economy case are two.
First, now in contrast to the closed economy case, households have access to foreign goods
and therefore a money injection increases consumption. And with respect to the frictionless
case, since capital is country speci¯c, the presence of ¯nancial frictions makes the e®ects
stronger. This last result points to the direction of introducing capital as a composite of both
home and foreign goods.
Table 7 shows some statistics for the simulated series. It stands out the countercyclicality
of investment, re°ecting the dynamics analyzed previously. This countercyclicality is lowered
under credit market imperfections. Furthermore, ¯nancial frictions strengthen the interna-
tional transmission of a money injection. The reason is that the expenditure switching e®ect
towards foreign consumption reduces even more investment.
6.3 Fiscal shocks
What are the e®ects of rising ¯scal expenditure in one country, and how are these transmitted
to another economy? Understanding these shocks becomes relevant in monetary unions
without ¯scal harmonization like the Euro zone.
For simplicity and for purposes of illustration, this paper focuses on the simple case in
which government spending is ¯nanced by lump sum taxes from households. Figure 3 and
Table 8 show the results. The shock illustrated in the impulse response functions is a one
standard deviation shock at time t = 2; and it is very persistent (½g = 0:95). The persistence
of the ¯scal shock generates a wealth e®ect on households, increasing their supply of labor.
Thus, the rise in government spending fuels output and labor. In the absence of ¯nancial
frictions there is a crowding-out e®ect that reduces both consumption and investment at
Home. At the same time, the rise in Home demand makes local goods more expensive,
leading to nominal and real appreciations. Higher Home prices reduce Foreign demand for
Home goods, and force the Foreign country to produce more as expenditure shifts towards
Foreign. The crowding-out e®ect on consumption is transmitted to the Foreign country.
As in the productivity shock, the response of most variables is stronger when there are
¯nancial frictions. More concretely, the expansion is not only ampli¯ed at Home but also more
25persistent. However, the crowding-out e®ect is stronger on private consumption and weaker
on investment under ¯nancial frictions, because higher output favors investment through the
procyclicality of entrepreneurs' net worth, whereas higher prices harm consumption.
Table 8 shows some conditional moments for the two cases plotted and compares them
with the uncorrelated case under ¯nancial frictions and the frictionless model. From the
table two main results arise. First, as shown in the impulse response functions, the ¯nancial
channel incorporated here shows that the crowding-out e®ect on consumption is stronger
and that on investment is weaker if there are ¯nancial frictions. This suggests a role for
¯nancial frictions in the crowding-out e®ects of ¯scal shocks, an aspect which is investigated
further in the next section. Second, in response to ¯scal shocks and in a scenario of ¯nancial
frictions, countries move further apart than in the frictionless case. This is re°ected in the
correlation of output across countries that is reduced if there are ¯nancial frictions, whereas
cross-country investment comovement is increased. The expenditure switching e®ect plus the
reallocation of resources towards investment are the main reasons for this second result.
6.4 Net worth shocks
In this instance, the case without ¯nancial frictions is trivial: the impulse response functions
are zero because the shock has no e®ect. On the other hand, in the case with frictions, a
positive shock to entrepreneurs' net worth reduces their demand for loans and what they
borrow is at a lower price. This boosts investment and production. Local prices rise due
to increased investment demand, so that the real exchange rate falls, and households switch
demand towards the Foreign good. This dampens the boom in output. The e®ects of such a
shock appear in Figure 4 and Table 9.
The net worth shock is very persistent (½Z = 0:9) so the resulting expansion lasts a long
time. The shock causes very di®erent behavior in the two countries: after a ¯nancial shock at
Home, higher output at Home coincides with a depression in the Foreign country. Later, as
consumption demand for foreign goods builds up, output and investment rise in the foreign
country too.
Higher expected productivity of capital prolongs the fall in consumption and the rise
in prices. The ¯nancial channel here favors clearly investment at the cost of consumption.
26Also cross-country consumption correlations are stonger under ¯nancial frictions, as appears
in Table 9, for both the correlated and uncorrelated shocks. The table also reports other
conditional moments for the simulated series. The results are closer to the ones implied by
the productivity shock regarding the procyclicality of variables. However, consumption is
countercyclical whereas investment is highly procyclical. This is explained by the nature of
the shock, favoring investment as opposed to consumption.
7 International transmission and spillovers
Little is known of what drives international business cycles closer or further apart. There is
some agreement on the role played by variables such as trade intensity, but little consensus
on the relevance of other determinants.14 This model allows us to address this issue, so
this section analyzes the e®ects of changes in the degree of openness, distribution costs and
¯nancial frictions on the international transmission of shocks. The previous section already
shed some light on the direction of the comovements. The focus now is on the changes in cross-
country correlations of output, consumption and investment. The benchmark considered is
the baseline calibration of the model with ¯nancial frictions of Section 5.
7.1 The degree of openness
Previous work has studied the role of ¯nancial frictions in a closed-economy °exible and sticky
price general equilibrium monetary models.15 Recently there are more papers that investigate
the e®ects of opening the economy and considering ¯nancial frictions in sticky price models.
This section analyzes how the results presented in the previous section change if we increase
the degree of openness of both economies. Notice that this parameter determines the strength
of the expenditure switching e®ect, and therefore is crucial for the international dynamics of
the model.
Tables 11a to 11.d report the cross-country correlations for output, consumption and in-
vestment to di®erent degrees of openness for productivity, money supply, ¯scal and net worth
14See, for example, Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004).
15See for example Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000) for the sticky price case, and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2000) or de Blas (2003) for the °exible price model.
27shocks, respectively. I consider symmetric shocks both correlated and uncorrelated. A higher
degree of openness increases the cross-country correlations of investment and consumption
with little change in that of output when there is a rise in productivity. Notice that the
correlation of output across countries is always negative when shocks are uncorrelated.
When there are money supply shocks countries move closer the higher the degree of
openness. The same is true for investment and less so for consumption.
Results do not change much with respect to the benchmark if the economy is shocked by
a shock in government spending. However, cross-country investment and output correlations
fall under correlated ¯scal shocks the higher the degree of openness. This means that the
demand shock generated at Home (the rise in government spending) translates into a sup-
ply shock at Foreign, with a stronger negative e®ect on Home investment and output as °
increases.
In the case of a shock to net worth, increasing the openness of the economy increases
the cross-country correlation of consumption, re°ecting a kind of risk sharing. The expendi-
ture switching e®ect becomes stronger as ° rises, since the degree of home bias is reduced.
The correlation of investment across countries changes sign depending on the shocks being
correlated or not. With correlated shocks good times for entrepreneurs at Home are trans-
mitted to Foreign with delay and lower magnitude. The boom experienced at Home reduces
prices and increases demand for Home goods. International trade allows Foreign consumers
to enjoy lower prices in the Home produced good. The bene¯t is increasing in the degree of
openness. If shocks are correlated, the bene¯t goes in both directions and in detriment of
investment. However, the cross-country correlation of investment decreases as the degree of
openness rises, in the same direction of output.
As a conclusion, the reduced home bias (i.e. higher degree of openness, °) strengthens
the links of consumption across countries but decreases those of investment. This is a natural
feature of this model, since consumption is a composite of Home and Foreign goods, whereas
investment is made out of domestic goods only. A natural extension would be to consider
capital goods as a composite also of Home and Foreign goods, and then make investment be
tied to international factors too.
287.2 Distribution costs
Next I consider the role of distribution costs in the international transmission of shocks. The
introduction of trade costs in the way it is done in this paper is rather new. I follow Burnstein,
Neves and Rebelo (2003) and assume that part of the importing country's production is
dedicated to transport. In this sense, the cost of transport will be a®ected by the e±ciency
of the economy and other fundamentals. This e±ciency can be also altered by the presence
of distortions in ¯nancial markets. Therefore, it is interesting to study how much these
distribution costs may a®ect the transmission mechanism in this scenario.
The results are displayed in Tables 12.a to 12.d. As before, I report cross-country correla-
tions under productivity, money supply, ¯scal and net worth shocks for output, consumption
and investment under three di®erent scenarios. The ¯rst column corresponds to the bench-
mark calibrated value of distribution costs, and the rest simulate the model for increasing
values of Á: In all cases, the simulations are made for symmetric shocks both correlated and
uncorrelated.
In the face of productivity shocks, higher distribution costs increase the comovement of
output across countries, whereas consumption and investment are less connected. The reason
is that higher Á means a higher cost of importing goods, that is, to consume a certain amount
of the Foreign good, more domestic goods must be devoted. This increases the cross-country
correlation of output. At the same time, Foreign households ¯nd it more expensive to consume
Home goods, reducing the correlation of consumption across countries. This suggests that
there must be a level of distribution costs such that the output-consumption puzzle may
be solved. This means that a model in which it is very costly to import consumption goods
might be good to calibrate cross-country output and consumption correlations. Such a model
could include the existence of nontraded goods, that is, goods whose importing costs is very
high. Regarding investment, entrepreneurs need consumption goods to produce capital, and
higher trade costs increase the price of capital in the two countries.
Under money supply shocks, the bene¯ts from nominal exchange rate depreciations are
lower the higher distribution costs. So cross-country output correlations are reduced and so
29are for investment. There are almost no change in consumption. The e®ects are stronger if
there are no correlations.
Countries business cycles diverge in all cases the higher dsitribution costs and if the
economies are shocked by ¯scal shocks.
When there are shocks to net worth at Home, cross-country correlation of output slightly
increases while reducing that of consumption. The reasoning above helps understand the
mechanism. In this case, it is more costly and less e±cient in terms of the own domestic goods
to consume foreign goods (the expenditure switching e®ect) and this favors investment. This
increases the correlation of investment across countries, while lowering that of consumption.
7.3 Financial frictions
In this model, there are several parameters that capture the degree of ¯nancial frictions.
I focus on monitoring costs in this section, since ¹c = 0 makes the model collapse to a
standard two-country frictionless model, and ¹c > 0 establishes a wedge between capital and
consumption goods that drives the dynamics of the model.
Worse ¯nancial conditions increase the sensitivity of output and the economy in general
to shocks, as shown in Section 6. The focus here will be more on the transmission of these
shocks across countries when the degree of ¯nancial frictions worsens worldwide. Tables 13.a
to 13.d report the cross-country correlations for output, consumption and investment for
productivity, ¯scal and net worth shocks to increasing degrees of ¯nancial frictions.
In the case of productivity shocks, as analyzed in Section 6, larger monitoring costs
increase the volatility of the domestic real variables facing uncorrelated asymmetric shocks,
while keeping more or less constant a Foreign. At the same time, the correlation of output
across countries is reduced, making them diverge as ¯nancial frictions become worse.
This table con¯rms the results anticipated in Section 6.1. Recent studies ¯nd that in-
creasing di®erences in ¯nancial systems reduce the comovement of business cycles across
countries.16 In this paper, results go in the same line since increasing the degree of ¯nan-
cial imperfections makes countries diverge in their behavior, independently on the correlated
16See Faia (2002) and Hairault et al. (2002).
30or uncorrelated source of the shocks. The rationale goes as follows. A productivity shock
at Home is interpreted as a supply shock. Home consumption goods become relatively less
expensive for Foreign consumer, who substitute domestic for imported goods (the expendi-
ture switching e®ect), in this sense the supply shock at Home induces a demand shock at
Foreign. Furthermore, if there are ¯nancial frictions that amplify and propagate the e®ects
of the shocks, not only is the supply shock at Home stronger, but also the demand shock at
Foreign. This is why increasing ¯nancial frictions makes countries' business cycles diverge.
If money supply shocks a®ect the economy, countries' comovement is lower if there are
¯nancial frictions. The opposite is true for consumption and investment.
Under shocks to government spending, the ¯rst remarkable fact is that ¯nancial frictions
make outputs in the two countries move in opposite directions. This fact was analyzed
in section 6.2. As mentioned above the source of divergence is the e®ect that more public
expenditure has on investment and how this is transmitted abroad. Worse ¯nancial conditions
reduce even more the comovement of output and consumption across countries with a positive
e®ect on investment. The results presented here suggest that a higher degree of ¯nancial
frictions may o®set the crowding-out e®ect on investment, leading to a procyclical investment
after a ¯scal shock. The opposite is true for consumption. At the same time, higher ¹c
increases the cross-country correlation of investment, reducing that of consumption. Thus,
a high degree of ¯nancial frictions may help breaking the output-consumption puzzle in the
event of a ¯scal shock.
Finally, when a positive shock to entrepreneurs' net worth is considered the correlation
across countries falls in all cases. Results do not change qualitatively as shocks become
correlated.
8 Conclusions and future research
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the international transmission of shocks
in economies in which ¯nancial markets are not perfect. To this aim, I have developed a
two-country °exible price general equilibrium model with distribution costs and ¯nancial
31frictions. Additionally, the paper leads to some conclusions on the international comovement
of business cycles.
Results show that imperfections in credit markets amplify the e®ects of shocks both at the
domestic and at the international level. However, if the degree of ¯nancial frictions increases
in both countries, cross-country output correlations are reduced in response to productivity,
¯scal and net worth shocks. That is, international business cycle comovement, measured as
cross-country output correlations, is increasing in the degree of openness and distribution
costs, and as in previous literature, decreasing in the degree of ¯nancial frictions.
The introduction of distribution costs allows for the study of cross-country consumption
correlations too. In this model, the output-consumption puzzle can be solved but this may
require a degree of distribution costs too high compared to the values reported by the data.
However, the result leads to the conclusion that a model with very high costs in import-
ing some of the consumption goods might be a good instrument to analyze international
consumption issues.
Finally, the paper ¯nds a key role for ¯scal shocks in two ways. First, the behavior of
the ¯scal authority is relevant for its e®ects on investment. In this classical model, a rise in
government spending induces a lower crowding-out e®ect on investment and stronger on con-
sumption if there are ¯nancial frictions. Second, correlated asymmetric ¯scal shocks reduce
the international comovement of output the higher the degree of openness and distribution
costs. In the case of ¯nancial frictions this is also true, and cross-country correlations be-
come even negative if shocks are uncorrelated. This last result relevant to the extent that it
hinges on the role of ¯scal policy (a stabilizing instrument in the hands of governments) in
the comovement of output across countries.
Therefore, the immediate extension is to analyze the role of ¯scal policy in the trans-
mission of shocks across countries in a monetary union. In this scenario, countries will only
have one stabilization instrument (¯scal policy) to respond to shocks. Di®erent responses by
each country to the same perturbation may lead to a convergence or divergence of business
cycles. The degree of ¯nancial integration will also be an important factor to consider in such
a framework.
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34Tables
Table 1. Cross-country output correlations
Belgium 1:0000
Germany¤ 0:9947 1:0000
Spain 0:7062 0:9831 1:0000
France 0:7737 0:9865 0:7159 1:0000
Italy 0:7122 0:9943 0:5678 0:6393 1:0000
EMU 0:8400 0:9954 0:7801 0:8371 0:7745 1:0000
Japan 0:4492 0:9368 0:3900 0:3294 0:3636 0:4372 1:0000
UK 0:3867 0:9869 0:3518 0:3089 0:4524 0:2438 0:1000 1:0000
USA 0:3557 0:9856 0:1426 0:0807 0:3365 0:2568 0:0794 0:4920
Table 2. Cross-country consumption correlations
Belgium 1:0000
Germany¤ 0:9784 1:0000
Spain 0:6439 0:9520 1:0000
France 0:6013 0:9538 0:6203 1:0000
Italy 0:6576 0:9615 0:7732 0:4285 1:0000
EMU 0:6898 0:9823 0:8249 0:7279 0:8049 1:0000
Japan 0:2111 0:9179 0:1870 0:1886 0:0673 0:1493 1:0000
UK 0:0845 0:9703 0:3318 0:2839 0:1102 0:2284 0:0927 1:0000
USA 0:0555 0:9745 0:0508 ¡0:0447 0:0083 0:1076 ¡0:1703 0:5717
Table 3. Cross-country investment correlations
Belgium 1:0000
Germany¤ 0:4115 1:0000
Spain 0:5919 0:2398 1:0000
France 0:6052 0:3002 0:8165 1:0000
Italy 0:5099 0:2715 0:6650 0:6950 1:0000
EMU 0:6766 0:4588 0:8180 0:8808 0:7988 1:0000
Japan 0:4867 0:2419 0:5469 0:5171 0:5389 0:5470 1:0000
UK 0:5815 0:2388 0:3422 0:3298 0:2570 0:3516 0:2639 1:0000
USA 0:2744 0:3608 ¡0:1079 0:0835 0:1018 0:1894 0:0710 0:3866
Table 4. Country-speci¯c correlations
½(y;c) ½(y;i) ½(y;g) ½(g;c) ½(g;i)
Belgium 0:6697 0:6035 0:0047 0:2206 ¡0:3003
Germany¤ 0:9878 0:3207 0:9447 0:9436 0:2348
Spain 0:8201 0:8332 0:5039 0:5505 0:4565
France 0:7668 0:8950 ¡0:3556 ¡0:2624 ¡0:5357
Italy 0:6526 0:7598 ¡0:0344 0:0658 0:0332
EMU 0:8119 0:9036 ¡0:1107 0:0857 ¡0:1262
Japan 0:6493 0:9102 ¡0:0574 ¡0:0335 ¡0:0823
UK 0:8570 0:7391 ¡0:2755 ¡0:2998 ¡0:2688
USA 0:8283 0:9351 ¡0:0364 0:0822 ¡0:1126
For all the tables the sample goes from 1980:1-2004:2, except for Germany (1991:1 to 2004:2).
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts.
35Table 5: Unconditional moments
No CMI CMI
Uncorrelated Correlated Uncorrelated Correlated
¾y 1.065 1.07 1.172 1.162
½(y;c) 0.601 0.629 0.404 0.450
½(y;i) 0.894 0.823 0.916 0.874
½(y;h) 0.795 0.746 0.805 0.753
½(y;y¤) -0.022 0.134 -0.017 0.059
½(c;c¤) 0.109 0.751 0.127 0.738
½(i;i¤) 0.002 0.021 0.018 -0.121
Table 6: Conditional moments to a productivity shock at Home
No CMI CMI
Uncorrelated Correlated Uncorrelated Correlated
¾y 1:06 1:08 1:15 1:14
½(y;c) 0:952 0:909 0:798 0:761
½(y;i) 0:992 0:975 0:981 0:970
½(y;h) 0:809 0:758 0:839 0:804
½(y;y¤) 0:042 0:191 ¡0:030 0:093
½(c;c¤) 0:401 0:826 0:320 0:793
½(i;i¤) 0:018 ¡0:183 ¡0:027 ¡0:234
Table 7: Conditional moments to a money supply shock at Home
No CMI CMI
Uncorrelated Correlated Uncorrelated Correlated
¾y 0.062 0.062 0.058 0.059
½(y;c) 0.952 0.909 0.966 0.909
½(y;i) -0.923 -0.835 -0.934 -0.821
½(y;h) 0.963 0.950 0.973 0.960
½(y;y
¤) 0.040 0.169 0.048 0.187
½(c;c
¤) -0.037 0.699 -0.027 0.752
½(i;i
¤) 0.346 0.896 0.406 0.938
Table 8: Conditional moments to a ¯scal shock at Home
No CMI CMI
Uncorrelated Correlated Uncorrelated Correlated
¾y 0.008 0.009 0:009 0:011
½(y;c) -0.717 -0.719 ¡0:808 ¡0:815
½(y;i) -0.283 -0.126 0.036 0.193
½(y;h) 0.994 0.997 0:999 0:999
½(y;y¤) 0.093 0.663 0.055 0.599
½(c;c¤) 0.347 0.760 0.382 0.756
½(i;i¤) 0.016 -0.100 -0.017 0.095
36Table 9: Conditional moments to a net worth shock at Home
No CMI CMI
Uncorrelated Correlated Uncorrelated Correlated
¾y na na 0.178 0.181
½(y;c) na na -0.572 -0.575
½(y;i) na na 0.873 0.874
½(y;h) na na 0.957 0.954
½(y;y¤) na na 0.019 0.207
½(c;c¤) na na 0.333 0.458
½(i;i¤) na na 0.025 0.192


































































































































38Robustness analysis: distribution costs
Table 12.a. Cross-country correlations to productivity shock
Á = 0:038
(benchmark)

























Table 12.b. Cross-country correlations to money supply shock
Á = 0:038
(benchmark)

























Table 12.c. Cross-country correlations to ¯scal shock
Á = 0:038
(benchmark)

























Table 12.d. Cross-country correlations to net worth shock
Á = 0:038
(benchmark)

























39Robustness analysis: ¯nancial frictions
Table 13.a. Cross-country correlations to productivity shock



























Table 13.b. Cross-country correlations to money supply shock



























Table 13.c. Cross-country correlations to ¯scal shock



























Table 13.d. Cross-country correlations to net worth shock



























40Figure 1: Figure 1: Impulse response functions to a correlated one standard deviation increase













































































The solid-crossed line refers to the frictionless model and the dash-circled line to the model with
¯nancial frictions. All variables are plotted as percentage deviations from their steady state values.
41Figure 2: Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a correlated one standard deviation increase




















































































The solid-crossed line refers to the frictionless model and the dash-circled line to the model with
¯nancial frictions. All variables are plotted as percentage deviations from their steady state values.
42Figure 3: Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a correlated one standard deviation increase





















































































The solid-crossed line refers to the frictionless model and the dash-circled line to the model with
¯nancial frictions. All variables are plotted as percentage deviations from their steady state values.
43Figure 4: Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a correlated one standard deviation increase


















































































The solid-crossed line refers to the frictionless model and the dash-circled line to the model with
¯nancial frictions. All variables are plotted as percentage deviations from their steady state values.
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